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  Abstract:  For nearly a decade now, the specter of financial malaise has haunted 
East Asia.  It overwhelms the weaker economies.  It imperils North America.  Persistently, it 
refuses to retreat.   
  Yet even as the specter teases entrepreneurs with insolvency, some observers 
suggest that responsibility might lie with the entrepreneurs themselves.  Might not the source 
of the malaise lie in the very governance structures they created and maintain, particularly in 
the shareholding and board composition patterns they support?  Might not its solution lie in 
legal reforms that would force them to remake those structures?  
  To examine these questions, we consider the governance arrangements at the heart 
of the malaise:  in corporate Japan.  Theoretically, we find nothing to suggest that the source 
of the recession lies in issues of corporate governance, and nothing to suggest that the 
solution lies in corporate law reform.  We then assemble data from the banking industry -- 
one of the sectors most badly struck by the financial crisis.  Empirically, we find nothing to 
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  As the century opens, we blame the international financial malaise on lax banking 
regulation.  The nearly global ideology of democracy what it is, we blame the government when 
we have half a chance.  Banks handle nothing if not finance, and they do seem in trouble.  In the 
U.S., bad regulatory design arguably drove the S&L fiasco.  Within Japan, maybe the same 
thing ruined the banks.  
  We blame it on rich managers.  The global rhetoric of populism what it is, we blame the 
rich even without half a chance.  The rich are different from us, and at various turns in the last 
century Americans blamed John D. Rockefeller, Michael Milken, and William Gates.  Japanese 
blamed the Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Iwasaki families.  The rich do seem to be wreaking 
havoc in Russia.  Maybe they did the same in Japan. 
  We blame it on bad “corporate governance,” and in imagining this nightmare we 
implicate both the spineless regulators and the avaricious rich.  Absent well-performing firms, 
economies will not rebound.  Absent good governance, firms will not perform well.  And 
maybe absent stringent regulatory frameworks, greedy managers will install the lackadaisical 
governance structures that generate the lackluster performance we see today.  
  Or so the self-styled public intellectuals declare.  But is it so?  Public intellectuals have 
been wrong before.  Did managers indeed cause the malaise by wheeling and dealing beyond 
the law?  Or did the intellectuals yet again round up their usual suspects? 
  To explore these issues, we focus on Japan.  Arguably, the crisis and recession began 
there.  Arguably, they remain as intractable there as anywhere.  Arguably -- at least the blond 
institutional investors peddling the CalPIRG gospel in Tokyo so claim -- they demand the same 
solution there that they demand everywhere else.
1   
  Whatever did cause the international malaise (and we offer no hypothesis), it was not 
bad corporate governance.  Indeed, by standard economic theory it could not have been bad 
governance, for competitive capital and product markets drive firms to adopt efficient 
governance mechanisms or die.  Without a governance structure that promotes investor returns, 
a firm faces higher capital costs.  Unable to expand as cheaply as its rivals, it faces higher 
product or service market costs.  Eventually, its competitors drive it out of business.  In such a 
world, proposals to improve corporate governance are $20 bills on sidewalks:  either ideas firms 
have already adopted, or ideas that would fail. 
To apply this logic to the current malaise, we first summarize the literature tying the 
crisis to corporate governance (Section I).  We then trace the implications of basic governance 
theory (bad governance cannot account for the depression; Section II).  We ask whether the 
malaise is systemic or sector-specific (sector-specific, we conclude), and which sectors have 
suffered most severely.  We take data from a major, badly depressed sector (banking) and 
examine the tie between performance and governance.  The results, we find, closely track the 
basic governance theory we introduced earlier (Section III, Appendix).  Finally, we ask whether 
the depression resulted from the deregulation in the financial services industry.  No, we answer, 
and explain why not (Section IV). 
 
I.  Governance and the Recession 
  “The 1990s,” several prominent economists recently observed, “turned out to be a 
traumatic decade for Japan.”  As the “unemployment rate soared,” it became “Japan’s ‘lost 
                     
1 See Takafusa Kamiya, Shagai torishimariyaku no juyo to kyokyu [The Supply of and Demand for 
Outside Directors], 1155 Jurisuto 129, 130 (1999) (discussing CalPIRG’s Japan program).   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 3 
decade.’”  The trauma had begun in 1990 with the fall in stock and land prices.  Prices had been 
high before, but not -- these economists argued -- because of “economic fundamentals.”   
Instead, they had been high because of a “classic speculative bubble.”
2   
When the “bubble” burst, banks that had lent money on the now-depressed real estate 
found their loans uncollectable.  As they lost their funds, firms that relied on them found 
themselves without access to cash.  By 1997, the financial crisis had spread across Asia.   
Appearing first in Thailand, it soon engulfed South Korea and Indonesia.  By the end of the 
century, it had reached even Russia and Brazil. 
Still, a fall in asset prices -- whether a burst bubble or no -- should not cause a ten-year 
recession.  Several observers (we discuss the literature in more detail below) blame the 
economy’s failure to rebound on bad corporate governance.  Typically, they cite the decline of 
the “main bank system.”  Japanese firms, they explain, for years borrowed from many banks but 
maintained one as their “main bank.”
3  That bank lent the most to the firm, and monitored it on 
behalf of other lenders.  As Japan deregulated its capital markets in the 1980s, firms 
increasingly switched from bank finance to the newly available sources.  By so doing they cut 
their dependence on their main bank.  In the process, they reduced both the bank’s access to the 
information it needed to monitor the firm, and its incentive to do so. 
  By cutting main bank monitoring, these observers continue, Japan eliminated the one 
mechanism that might seriously have checked managerial folly and greed.  Although managers 
in U.S. firms answered to shareholders, Japanese managers had long ignored the stock market.  
Although U.S. managers answered to a corporate control market, Japanese managers faced 
none.  As the “reliance on debt capital [by Japanese firms] has fallen,” predicted management 
scholar Michael E. Porter in the early 1990s, “main banks will take a diminished role ... as 
effective monitors of companies ....  The lack of effective monitoring will accentuate existing 
weaknesses of the Japanese system.”
4  By the close of the decade, concluded sociologist Bai 




II. Governance and Performance 
A.  Demsetz-Lehn in Theory: 
  And yet, for reasons  economists Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn explained in 1986, 
this corporate governance talk should leave one troubled.  Elsewhere, we discuss why the “main 
                     
2 Thomas F. Cargill, Michael M. Hutchison & Takatoshi Ito, Financial Policy and Central Banking in 
Japan 1, 11, 14 (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2000).  For skepticism toward bubble-analysis generally, see Peter M. 
Garber, Famous First Bubbles:  The Fundamentals of Early Manias (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2000). 
3 See generally Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick & Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System:  An 
Introductory Overview, in The Japanese Main Bank System 1 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1994); Paul Sheard, Reciprocal Delegated Monitoring in the Japanese Main Bank 
System, 8 Journal of Japanese & International Economies 1 (1994); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and 
Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 11 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 399 (1989).  For a 
critique of this literature, see Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Nihon keizairon no gokai:  “keiretsu”  no jubaku 
kanara no kaiho [Misunderstandings in the Theory of the Japanese Firm:  Liberation from the Spell of the 
“Keiretsu”] chs. 1, 5 (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 2001); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of 
the Main Bank:  Japan and Comparative Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for 
Law, Economics & Business, Discussion Paper 333 (2001); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Directed Credit?  
Capital Market Competition in High-Growth Japan, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics 
& Business, Working Paper 334 (2001). 
4 [Comments], in Mitsuhiro Fukao, Financial Integration, Corporate Governance, and the Performance of 
Multinational Companies 92, 94 (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution, 1995). 
5 Bai Gao, Japan’s Economic Dilemma:  The Institutional Origins of Prosperity and Stagnation 19 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2001). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 4 
bank system” never existed anywhere but in the academic imagination.
6  Yet even with a main 
bank system, firms that maintain underperforming governance arrangements should face higher 
costs in the capital market.  That penalty should in turn raise their product or service market 
costs.  Over time, such firms should not survive.
7   
  Demsetz and Lehn made the point in the context of the Berle-Means debate -- were 
public American firms at a competitive disadvantage because their dispersed ownership patterns 
allowed managers to shirk undetected?
8  They argued no, but their logic applies more broadly:  
given competitive capital markets, firms with ownership or governance structures that do not 
minimize investor costs will tend to go out of business.  In that context, any reforms academics 
might propose were either reforms firms had already incorporated, or ideas that would not 
work. 
  The point is not that firms consciously chose their ownership structure to maximize 
shareholder returns.  Rather, firms that do maximize those returns will raise new capital more 
cheaply.  Over time, such firms will disproportionately tend to survive.  In equilibrium, the 
firms that persist will tend to be those that choose ownership and management structures that 
increase investor returns. 
  What is more, because the efficient government structure is specific to a firm, scholars 
who tie observed firm profitability to governance structures will find no relationship.  Recall the 
logic.  Firms with inefficient structures will fail and drop out of the sample.  If so, then a firm 
for which a given structure promotes shareholder returns will tend to persist, while a firm for 
which the same structure generates losses will tend to disappear.  Although a particular structure 
may well lower shareholder returns at most firms, that point will not appear in the data since 
only the firms at which it increases returns will tend to survive. 
  Despite occasional debates about its empirical implications, the logic behind the 
Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis remains unchallenged.
9  Recently, empiricists have confirmed its 
application to the U.S.
10  In a related article, we do the same with Japan.  Toward that end, we 
ask how firms responded to the late 1940s zaibatsu dissolution program -- an exogenous shock 
to the pre-war ownership equilibrium.  Almost immediately, the firms subject to the dissolution 
began reconcentrating their ownership.  A year after the close of the occupation (1953), they 
had not yet completed the process, and firms with dispersed shareholdings still earned lower 
profits than their peers.  By 1958, the equilibrating process was largely compete.  The formerly 
zaibatsu firms had reconcentrated their ownership (though at different levels than twenty years 
                     
6 Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note (Myth). 
7 Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership, 93 Journal of Political 
Economy 1155 (1985); see generally Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility:  Dangerous and Harmful, 
Though Maybe Not Irrelevant, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1227, 1229 (1999). 
8 Adolph Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York:  
MacMillan, 1932). 
9 Among the articles contesting the empirics are:  Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 
Management Ownership and Market Valuation:  An Empirical Analysis, xx J. Fin. Econ. 293 (1988); Randall 
Morck, Masao Nakamura & Anil Shivdasani, Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value in Japan, 73 J. Bus. 539 
(2000); John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. 
Fin. Econ. 595 (1990); Holderness, Randall Kroszner & Sheehan, Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership since 
the Great Depression, 54 J. Fin. 435 (1999). 
10 Myeong-Hyeon Cho, Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value:  An Empirical 
Analysis, 43 J. Fin. Econ. 103 (1998); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board 
Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, 20 Fin. Mgt. 101 (1991); Charles P. Himmelberg, R. 
Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between 
Ownership and Performance, 53 J. Fin. Econ. 353 (1999). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 5 




B. Demsetz-Lehn Applied: 
 1.    Cross-shareholdigs.-- (a) Generally.  For most proposals to “improve” Japanese 
governance, the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis poses devastating implications.  According to a 
variety of writers, the desultory Japanese economic performance reflects the nefarious effect of 
widespread cross-shareholding arrangements.  Suppose, however, that these arrangements cut 
shareholder returns at a given class of firms.  Those firms should incur a penalty on the capital 
market when they try to raise funds.  Suffering when they need to expand, over time they should 
“wither away.”  If the cross-shareholdings impose a net cost on the constituent firm 
shareholders, firms with the arrangements should tend to disappear.   
  In fact, the cross-shareholding arrangements are not disappearing, for there were no 
arrangements to vanish.  Take the principal roster of Japanese corporate groupings from their 
putative heyday in 1965.
12  Among the Sumitomo keiretsu of 48 non-financial firms, only 
eleven pairs of firms had at least a one percent stake in each other; among the Mitsui keiretsu of 
48 firms, only six pairs did; among the Sanwa keiretsu of 36 firms, only six pairs; among the 
Mitsubishi keiretsu of 46 firms, only four; among the Fuji keiretsu of 45 firms, only three; and 
among the Daiichi keiretsu of 29 firms, only 2 pairs.  Cross-shareholding in Japan was a myth 
from the start.
13   
  Between the financial and non-financial firms, more cross-holdings exist -- but not 
because anyone tried to exchange the shares.  Given that Japanese banks can legally hold stock 
(unlike banks in the U.S.),
14 prudent banks will diversify their assets into a broad equity 
portfolio.  Given that the standard keiretsu roster selects group members from among (inter alia) 
a bank’s principal borrowers,
15 banks will have the best information about those firms that the 
roster lists as group members.  If they invest in ways that economize on information costs, they 
will tend to buy stock in those members.  And if the borrowers in turn occasionally invest in 
their banks, cross-holdings will ensue.  Crucially, they will not ensue because anyone tried to 




  2.  Outside directors. -- (a) Generally.  Stock-exchange-listed Japanese firms seldom 
have outside directors.  Instead, they choose their directors from their senior managerial ranks, 
from their customers or suppliers (like banks), or from the government.  Might the absence of 
genuine outsiders generate bad governance?  So, again, do argue journalists, academics, 
                     
11 Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Ownership Matter:  Evidence from the Zaibatsu Dissolution 
Program, University of Tokyo Faculty of Economics, Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-105 (Feb. 2001). 
12 Keizai chosa kai, ed. Keiretsu no kenkyu [Research on the Keiretsu] (Tokyo:  Keizai chosa kai, various 
years). 
13 See generally Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of the Keiretsu, J. Econ. & Mgmt Strat. 
(forthcoming 2001); Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note (Nihon keizai ron), at ch. 3. 
14 The Glass-Steagall Act, Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, codified in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C. 
15 See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note (JEMS). 
16 Many observers cite cross-holdings in the mid-70% range.  These are not the figures for cross-
shareholdings, but rather for corporate shareholdings more generally. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 6 
politicians, and institutional investors.  As of this writing, by spring 2002 reformers planned to 
require by statute all large firms to install outside directors.
17 
  The ostensible logic behind the proposal resembles the logic behind its U.S. equivalents.  
Insiders will not scrutinize the actions their golfing buddies take, the story goes.  Instead, they 
will help them shunt firm perquisites to themselves.
18   
Alas, the reformist agenda again miss the logic of competitive capital markets.
19  Firms 
that insiders manipulate for private gain will earn investors less money.  Systematically 
delivering a lower return, they will suffer on the capital market and find that the funds to 
operate or expand come at a higher price.  Facing higher capital costs, over time they will tend 
to disappear.  In equilibrium, only firms that deliver competitive returns will endure. 
  Remember, outside directors do not just bring benefits.  They come at a cost, for 
generally they know little about firm dynamics.  They may be independent of everyone at the 
firm, but only because they know nothing about them.  For exactly that reason, U.S. firms long 
retained few outsiders.   
 
  (b) Outside directors and derivative suits.  Although U.S. firms have more outside 
directors now, they did not hire them to improve their governance.  If it were only to improve 
governance, capital market pressure would have induced them to hire the outsiders decades ago.  
Instead, in their eagerness only recently to hire outsiders they reflect the receptivity U.S. judges 
now show toward derivative litigation.  As corporate law scholar Roberta Romano explained, 
virtually all these suits involve extortionate claims that generate attorney fees but no 
shareholder returns.
20  For firms facing such claims, outside directors offer substantial benefits:  
by routing potential conflicts of interest through a committee of nominally independent 
outsiders, the firms can insulate themselves from virtually all duty of loyalty claims.  For such 
firms (which is to say, for almost all listed firms), outside directors offer cheap insurance 
against the plaintiffs’ securities bar.  
  Until recently, Japanese law imposed on derivative claimants a formidable set of costs, 
and virtually no shareholders filed suit.
21  Over the past few years, courts and legislators have 
begun to dismantle those burdens.
22  Even if the scheduled 2002 bill to require outside directors 
does not pass, firms may well start hiring outsiders anyway.  They would not be hiring them 
because outsiders improved management.  They would be hiring them because outsiders helped 
insulate them from fraudulent derivative litigation. 
 
 (c)  Retired  bureaucrats.  Scholars offer cross-cutting theories about bureaucrats-turned-
directors.  On the one hand, several argue that the retired bureaucrats retain their loyalty to the 
                     
17 Takayasu Kamiya, Kokai kaisha no kikan [The Mechanisms of the Public Corporation], 251 Hogaku 
kyoshitsu 69, 69 (2001). 
18 In fact, the reformers profer a more mottley set of reasons:  e.g., that outside directors will increase 
managerial efficiency and corporate social responsibility as well.  See Kamiya, supra note, at 69 (discussing draft 
bill). 
19 I.e., the logic behind Demsetz-Lehn.  It also misses the more general logic against mandatory corporate 
law terms, articulated most forcefully in Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, . 
20 Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:  Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 55 
(1991). 
21 Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1436 (1994). 
22 Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue:  The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. Legal Stud. 351 (2001). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 7 
government and help it monitor the banks (or other firms) to which they retired.
23  Because the 
bureaucrats earn no (present or future) compensation from the government, this reverses their 
incentives.   
  On the other hand, economists Akiyoshi Horiuchi and Katsutoshi Shimizu suggest that 
banks hire retired bureaucrats to buy regulatory largess.
24  Perhaps, they write, the firms hire 
them to keep someone on staff who can negotiate regulatory favors.
25  To test this hypothesis, 
they collect data on over 120 regional banks from 1985 to 1989.
 26  They then regress the log of 
the firms’ bad loan ratio in 1996 on the presence of a retired Ministry of Finance (MoF) or Bank 
of Japan (BoJ) bureaucrat.  The presence of an ex-MoF bureaucrat during the 1980s was indeed 
associated with a higher fraction of bad loans in 1996, they find.  The practice of taking retired 
bureaucrats constituted, they conclude, “implicit collusion to enable banks to expand risk-taking 
activities.”
27   
  “Corrupt” as public intellectuals may consider all this, for shareholders it potentially 
represents corporate governance as it should be.  If retired bureaucrats perform as Horiuchi and 
Shimizu suggest, then their presence on a board may indeed reduce regulatory compliance.  It 
will also, however, boost shareholder returns.  
 
  3.  Financial disclosure. -- Many observers argue that the lackluster Japanese 
performance follows from the lenient financial disclosure rules.  Since the post-war occupation, 
Japanese law has imposed costly disclosure requirements analogous to the 1933 Securities 
Act.
28  According to the reformists, though, on several counts the Japanese rules are less 
onerous than their U.S. analogues.  Perhaps that is true, perhaps not.  We have not tried to guage 
the relative stringency of the securities disclosure rules in the two countries.   
  Yet the reformers assert that because of the lax Japanese disclosure rules, investors 
cannot monitor the firms, and the firms find it harder to raise funds.
29  Disclosure is the 
currency of governance, and governance the means to investment.  Absent disclosure 
governance will not function, and absent governance investors will not part with their funds. 
                     
23 E.g., Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick & Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System:  An Introductory 
Overview,” in Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., The Japanese Main Bank System:  Its Relevance for 
Developing and Transforming Economies 3, 31 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1994):  “When a bank is judged 
to be poorly managed and to need drastic organizational and asset restructuring, typically the MOF arranges for a 
retired high-ranking MOF bureaucrat to enter as a director ....”  However, continue Aoki-Patrick-Sheard, the “flow 
of personnel is not limited to the trouble-shooting cases.”  Instead, “[h]ealthy banks are willing to accept ex-
bureaucrats for various reasons, including as a means of gaining access to valuable information from, and to exert 
influence on, the regulatory authorities.”  Id., at 32. 
24 Did Amakudari Undermine the Effectiveness of Regulator Monitoring in Japan?, 25 J. Banking & 
Finance 573 (2001). 
25 This also explains why the private firms would hire these ex-bureaucrats, a point made more informally 
in J. Mark Ramseyer & Frances M. Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace 111-19 (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
26 Apparently, to the regular regional banks, they add the so-called “type-two regional banks” -- 
successors to the pre-war mutual credit lotteries known as mujin.  Because of the sample heterogeneity that this 
causes, we focus only on regular regional banks. 
27 Horiuchi & Shimizu, supra note, at 590. 
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, et seq. 
29 Mark D. West even uses the lack of disclosure to explain how and why gangsters commandeer 
shareholder meetings in Japan.  Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United States:  Making 
Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 767 (1999). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 8 
  Unfortunately, the reformers again miss the logic of competitive securities markets (in 
this case, a logic classically explained by George J. Stigler).
30  To investors, disclosure brings 
benefits:  information they want to know.  They can either acquire the information individually, 
or invest in a firm that produces the information for everyone.  If a firm collects, assembles, and 
disseminates it, shareholders incur costs.  As a result, whether a firm produces the information 
itself or its investors do so privately, investors foot the bill.  If either the production of the 
information entails scale economies or the information is a firm-specific public good, they gain 
by having the firm produce the information collectively.  If not, then public disclosure yields no 
net benefits. 
With information, more is not necessarily better than less.
31  Even if the production of 
information involves scale economies or public goods, investors will not want all information.  
They will want only cost-justified information.  Beyond that point, they suffer a net loss from 
any additional information. 
  Given these principles, the optimal level of disclosure is that level generated in 
competitive securities markets.
32  In such markets, firms that disclose information up to but only 
up to the cost-justified level incur the lowest capital market costs.  They produce and expand 
most cheaply.  By contrast, firms that produce either too much information or too little suffer a 
capital market hit.  They eventually change their strategy or go out of business.  By this logic, 
when the law mandates disclosure beyond the level firms produce voluntarily, it necessarily 
mandates information that investors value less than the the cost to the firm of disclosing it.  
Otherwise, after all, the firm would have disclosed the information voluntarily to attract them.   
  What then do we make of reformist claims that disclosure in Japan is too low?  Nothing.  
Maybe the optimal level of disclosure in the U.S. is higher than in Japan.  Maybe the disclosure 
levels do not differ in fact.  More likely, maybe the U.S. accounting and legal cartels controlling 
the securities registration process enjoy more political clout than their Japanese counterparts.  
The bar generally is less powerful in the U.S. than in Japan,
33 but the securities sub-bars could 
well be otherwise.  To generate rents for themselves, maybe U.S. lawyers and accountants 
demanded disclosure requirements beyond the levels that benefit their clients.   
  Then again, maybe any differences reflect relative political clout within the securities 
industry.  Lower-tier securities analyists everywhere probably prefer more disclosure to less.  
Because investors bear the cost of the disclosure, mandatory disclosure lowers the informational 
advantage sophisticated analysts can offer.  If lower-tier analysts have less political power in 
Japan than in the U.S., that too could generate more lax disclosure rules in Japan. 
 
4.  Objections. -- (a) Mutual insurers.  Surely, many readers will claim, such a 
corrosively stock-market-based theory cannot apply to mutuals.  Yet mutual life-insurance firms 
                     
30 Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). 
31 For expositional simplicity, we focus exclusively on the costs associated with simple disclosure.  We 
ignore here the many costs associated with regulating and mandating disclosure -- costs such as shifts in the type of 
information disclosed, the disclosure of information benefiting competitors but not shareholders, or the reduced 
informativeness of the information in a heavily regulated environment caused by fears of liability.   
32 All this holds even when the information is unfavorable.  If a firm refuses to produce information that 
investors would ordinarily value, investors will presume the worst -- and their competitors will encourage them to 
adopt that presumption.  To avoid their adopting that presumption, firms will produce even information that is 
negative. 
33 J. Mark Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers, and Lawyer-Substitutes:  The Market for Regulation in 
Japan, 27 Harv. Int'l L.J. 499 (l986). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 9 
are prominent among bank shareholders, they observe.  If mutuals control the banks but do not 
maximize profits, then neither should the banks.
34   
Unfortunately, this observation misses the product market incentives that mutuals face.  
At any given level of contractual benefit, consumers choose from among life insurance 
contracts by price.  A mutual insurance firm can offer a given level of benefits at a competitive 
price only if it effectively invests the premiums it receives.  If it systematically buys under-
performing stock, it will earn a lower return than a firm that invests in market-performing stock.  
Over time, the former will offer less attractive prices than the latter.  Over time, competition in 
the insurance product market will tend to drive the former out of business.   
  
 (b)  Government  guarantees.  That the government guaranteed deposits and allegedly 
promised to rescue troubled banks affects none of this.  In the late 1980s, it insured deposits of 
up to 10 million yen per depositor.
35  Simultaneously, claim many observers, it informally 
promised not to let banks fail.  One might wonder about the latter, as it did let them fail once it 
faced hard times in the 1990s.  Nonetheless, law professors Curtis J. Milhaupt and Geoffrey P. 
Miller accurately capture the received wisdom when they characterize Japanese banking 
regulation “as a ‘convoy’ system of regulation” in which “the group is allowed to move no 
faster than its slowest members,” and the government focuses on “the avoidance of failure by 
financial institutions.”
36  As game theorist Masahiko Aoki put it, “the expectation that the 
government is responsible for the control of financially distressed banks, either through bailing-
out or an arrangement of acquisition by healthier banks, was generally shared and taken for 
granted.”
37 
  According to economists Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, these government 
guarantees eviscerated corporate governance.  The deposit insurance and promised rescues 
“deprived investors,” they write, “of incentives to monitor the performance of individual 
banks.”  In the process, they “hindered the development of market mechanisms to discipline 
bank management.”
38   
  In truth, the policies did nothing of the sort.  To be sure, they raised the possibility -- 
indeed probability -- of moral hazard.  If times were good the shareholders made money, but if 
times were bad the government paid the bill.  Under such conditions, shareholders obviously 
had an incentive to increase risk.  Crucially, they did not have any lesser incentives to monitor 
the firm.  Although the government changed the risk level that maximized firm profits, it did 
not reduce their incentive to ensure that managers selected that (now higher) optimal risk level.  
Neither did it reduce their incentive to ensure that managers took other profit-maximizing steps. 
 
 (c)  Competitive  restraints.  Nor is any of this changed by the restrictions on competition.  
Again, Hanazaki and Horiuchi speak for many scholars when they cite the “interest rate controls 
and restrictions on new entry into banking,”
39 and suggest these restraints weakened bank 
                     
34 See generally, e.g., Masaharu Hanazaki & Akiyoshi Horiuchi, A Vacuum of Governance in the 
Japanese Bank Management.  University of Tokyo Faculty of Economics Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-29 (Dec. 
1998), at 8-10. 
35 Nihon ginko kin’yu kenkyu jo, ed., Shimpan:  waga kuni no kin’yu seido [New Edition:  Our Country’s 
Financial System] 124 (Tokyo:  Nihon ginko, 1995). 
36 Cooperation, Conflict and Convergence in Japanees Finance:  Evidence from the “Jusen” Problem, 29 
Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1, 8 (1997). 
37 Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity:  Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, 
and the Transitional Economies 150 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2000). 
38 Hanazaki & Horiuchi, supra note, at 15-16. 
39 Hanazaki & Horiuchi, supra note, at 19. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 10 
governance.  However faithfully they capture the standard wisdom, they again mischaracterize 
the industry itself. 
  First, the loan interest rate controls did not bind.  In recent research, we investigate the 
effect that these rate ceilings had.  Even in the 1970s, they did not constrain.
40  From time to 
time, observers have suggested that banks circumvented the controls by requiring debtors to 
maintain low-interest deposits at the bank.  If true, the ploy could have ratcheted up the 
effective interest rates.  In fact, the loan interest rate caps were so porous that banks rarely 
demanded them.  Even without the “compensating balances,” they charged market-clearing 
rates. 
  Second, the entry restrictions did not shape competition.  As of the early 1990s, 
Japanese firms chose from among 140-plus banks.
41  With that many rivals, the industry was 
competitive, new entrants or no.  To be sure, only the three long-term credit banks (and a few 
other financial institutions) could issue debentures and only the seven trust banks could serve as 
trustees on any trusts their clients wanted.  Otherwise, the market was largely open to all -- 
hardly what law professors Curtis J. Milhaupt and Geoffrey P. Miller characterize as “extreme 
compartmentalization.”
42  In any case, money is nothing if not arbitrable.  Given the possibility 
of arbitrage, even harsher regulations than this would have had little effect. 
  
(d) The corporate control market.  And none of this hinges on any “corporate control 
market.”  Nearly four decades ago, Henry G. Manne tied the market for corporate control to 
efficient managerial incentives.
43  Ever since, many legal (and occasionally economic) 
academics have suggested that without a thriving takeover market managers will indulge their 
greed and indolence.  Eyeing few hostile acquisitions in Japan, they posit inefficient 
governance.  Only with the help of their “main bank,” they explain, do shareholders keep their 
managers in check.  Only in the “main bank,” as Paul Sheard famously put it, does Japan have a 
“substitute mechanism for [the] 'missing' takeover market."
44 
  Help as the prospect of a takeover may to constrain managers, firm efficiency does not 
hinge on it.  The takeover is not a prerequisite to efficient management.  Instead, it is one 
mechanism among several by which market competition moves assets to their most productive 
use.  In an academic environment that castigated takeovers as wasteful and irresponsible, 
Manne explained how they could facilitate productive efficiency.  He did not posit rampant 
agency slack without them. 
Takeovers or no, a firm sells good products cheap or -- eventually -- dies.  To make 
those products it needs capital, and to raise the capital it needs to convince investors to part with 
                     
40 Directed Credit?:  Capital Market Competition in High Growth Japan, Harvard Law School John M. 
Olin Center for Law, Business & Economics, Working Paper (2001). 
41 As of March 1993, there were 11 “city” (money-center) banks, 64 regional banks, 66 “type-2” regional 
banks, 3 long-term credit banks, and 7 trust banks.  There were no legal distinctions among the first three of these 
categories.  In addition, there were a wide variety of other financial institutions.  See generally Hiroshi Kusumoto, 
ed., Nihon no kin’yu gyosei, kancho, kin’yu kikan, [Japanese Financial Administration, Bureaucracy, and 
institutions] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1994). 
42 Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance:  Evidence from the “Jusen” Problem, 29 
Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1, 6 (1997).  Regional banks may have “specialize[d] in local lending to small business,” 
id. at 7, but (other than the effects of the ministry’s approval process for banches), this specialization was not 
regulatorily driven.   
43 Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965). 
44 Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 11 J. Econ. Beh. 
& Org. 399, 407 (1989); see M. Aoki, supra note, at 64:  “the neoclassical market for corporate control was 
eliminated as a prevailing system in Japan.  What took its place was stable shockholding by corporate stockholders 
centered around a main bank.” Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 11 
their money.  Whether as debt or as equity, however, investors will invest only if it promises 
them a market return.  Absent efficient governance, it will find that promise hard to keep. 
  In any case, the Japanese government never imposed high costs on tender offers 
anyway.  Until 1971, it regulated them not at all.  Since then, it has merely imposed on 
acquirers a framework modeled on the Williams Act.  Although the framework does raise the 
cost of an acquisition, it raises it little -- if any -- more than the Williams Act itself.
45  The point 
is crucial, because the incentive effect of the corporate control market does not hinge on the 
number of takeovers (if most firms are well-managed, after all, there will be few takeovers even 
in an unregulated market -- simply because there will be few plausible targets).  It hinges only 
on the potential for takeovers.  Sans regulatory interference, that potential will remain high. 
  In crucial ways, moreover, hostile takeovers and friendly mergers are substitutes, and 
there have always been plenty of mergers in Japan.
46  In the former, a would-be acquirer obtains 
the target shares by paying target shareholders a premium.  In the latter, it does so by bribing 
target managers to deliver the firm.  The bribe is a fiduciary duty breach, to be sure.  Disguised 
as a consulting agreement or other high-salary low-work contract, it is also unpoliceable.   
Suppose an acquirer could more efficiently run a firm than its incumbent managers.  Whether it 
offers the target shareholders a premium or those senior managers a consulting contract, it will 




III.  The Recession 
A.  Pervasive or Sectoral? 
  Speculative bubble or new information -- we will not guess what caused real estate 
prices to climb so precipitously in Japan in the late 1980s and fall disastrously a few years 
later.
48  Perhaps investors tried to play a bubble.  Perhaps they updated their information about 
future rental streams.  Perhaps some investors did one, some the other, and some a bit of both.  
What matters for our purposes is that prices rose, and then fell.  At the six largest cities (with 
prices indexed at 100 for March 1990), they rose from 24.5 in March 1980 to 33.6 in March 
1995.  After hitting 100 in March 1990, they fell to 54.7 by March 1995.  The fluctuation was 
particularly pronounced for commercial real estate:  from 16.7 in 1980 to 25.6 by 1985, 100 in 
1990, and then to 41.7 by 1995.
49 
  Within the real-estate industry, this fluctuation caused massive losses.  Obviously, those 
who bought high and sold low lost money, but the loss was a simple transfer:  assets moved to 
those who had sold high.  More inefficient were the projects driven by future projections.  On 
the basis of high expected rentals, contractors and developers (they at least seem not to have 
thought the prices a bubble) began golf courses, houses, office towers.  When expected future 
demand fell, many of them found their finished projects unmarketable and their unfinished ones 
not worth completing.  For the economy, they generated a dead-weight loss. 
                     
45 J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan:  Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1 (1987). 
46 Ramseyer, supra note (-1). 
47 Modelled on the 1933 Illinois Business Corporations Act, the Japanese corporations code imposes no 
particularly onerous costs on mergers.  See Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer, Japanese Law:  An Economic 
Approach ch. 5 (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
48 On this question, see, e.g., Robert S. Chirinko & Huntley Schaller, Businenss Fixed Investment and 
“Bubbles”:  The Japanese Case, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 663 (2001); Kazuo Ueda, Are Japanese Stock Prices Too 
High?, 4 J. Japanese & Int’l Eco. 351 (1990). 
49 Nihon fudosan kenkyu jo, ed., Shigai chikakaku shisu [Price Indexes for Metropolitan Real Estate] 
(Tokyo:  Nihon fudosan kenkyu jo, 1998).   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 12 
  Not only did developers and construction firms lose when the demand for real estate fell, 
so did those who lent them the money they lost.  Particularly when they borrowed nonrecourse 
by pledging the real estate, the firms could walk away from the loan.  Effectively, they forced a 
sale to their creditors.  Those creditors then lost additional funds when -- after the price collapse 
-- they lent extra money to try to help the debtors recover.   
  GNP did grow during the 1990s, even if at a slow pace,
50 and other than the firms that 
either bought real estate or lent to those that did, many firms remain healthy at the core.  To see 
this, first take indexed stock prices for Tokyo-Stock-Exchange-listed firms (we follow the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange’s classification of firms by industry; note that anomolies occasionally 
arise through changes in the classification scheme).  The effect of the real estate collapse 
appears directly.  Among the ten sectors with the lowest share prices relative to 1986, four were 
involved directly in real estate (agriculture, mining, real estate, and construction), and two more 
invested heavily in firms did (securities and banking). 
By contrast, the firms whose stock prices rose fastest since 1986 included firms in 
several of the sectors most central to the Japanese economy.  Stock prices in the automobile 
(transportation equipment) industry, for example, rose 86 percent between 1986 and 1998 (tire 
manufacturers catalogued under “rubber” grew even more rapidly).  Machinery, 
pharmaceuticals, and electrical products posted less dramatic results (9 percent, 16 percent, and 
18 percent), but still showed growth.  Economists Fumio Hayashi and Edward Prescott find no 
evidence that firms were unable to exploit profitable investment opportunities because of a 
credit crunch.
51  All this hardly shows a boom, but neither does it suggest an economy facing a 
governance crisis. 
                     
50 Fumio Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, The 1990s in Japan:  A Lost Decade (Unpublished, 2001) (0.5% 
annual GNP growth, 1991-2000). 
51 Id. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 13 
Table 1:  Stock Prices and Market Capitalization, 
1998 relative to 1986 
 
 
                    Stock Price       Market Capitalization 
Industries            98/86 (%)     98/86 (%)       1998  . 
 
Securities   37    *   3616 
Communication   50    *  16229 
Air transp   52   42   1149 
Agriculture   53   62    244 
Mining   53   51    279 
Real Estate   54   47   2835 
Petroleum ref’g   56   54   1647 
Construction   58   61   7185 
Textiles & app   66   73   3691 
Banks   70    *  32979 
Glass & cement   71   72   3300 
Gas & elec. util.   71   53  14152 
Marine transport.   75   74    863 
Nonferrous metals   77   68   2984 
Wholesale   77    *   7814 
Warehousing   80   82    660 
Foods   85  107   9376 
Metal Products   85  110   1830 
Pulp & paper   86   97   1666 
Chemicals   89    *  13810 
Iron & steel   90   84   4056 
Insurance   91    *   4804 
Land transport.   98  128  12066 
Misc. services  104  271   7879 
Misc. finance  105    *   6519 
Machinery 109  148    9491 
Retail  112    *  15002 
Pharmaceuticals  116    *  12804 
Electrical  prod 118  122 40275 
Misc.  manuf. 121 146    6792 
Precision instr.  130   80   2457 
Transp. equip.  186  176  24039 
Rubber 265  262    2688 
 
 Note:  Weighted average of 1998 stock price relative to 1986 stock 
price (in %), followed by 1998 market capitalization relative to 1986 market 
capitalization (in %), followed by 1998 market capitalization (in billion 
yen). 
 
  * Entry omitted either because the data are not available, or because 
they are potentially misleading due, for example, to changes in TSE 
classifications (e.g., by 1998 the TSE had split Chemicals into Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals) or to major changes in the firms included (e.g., the listing 
of the former national telephone monopoly NTT in Communcation). 
 
 Sources:  Tokyo shoken torihiki jo, Shoken tokei nempo [Securities 
Statistics Annual] (Tokyo:  Tokyo shoken torihiki jo, various years). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 14 
 
B.  Corporate Governance in Banking: 
  1.  Introduction. -- If basic economic theory suggests that the roots of the crisis lie not in 
issues of governance, consider data from the banking industry, one of the most severely 
troubled sectors and the largest among the 10 sectors doing the worst by Table 1.  Coupling data 
on corporate performance with those on corporate governance, ask whether the proposed 
governance changes would likely improve economic outcomes.   
  We describe our data, variables, and econometric estimates in more detail in the 
Appendix.  As explained there, we take financial data on 56 regional banks from 1977 to 1995 
and explore the effect of a wide variety of governance variables on bank performance. 
 
2.  Geography. -- The tests confirm the decisive effect of the real estate market.   
According to our regressions, metropolitan banks did well in the 1980s and poorly in the 1990s:  
in the early 1980s, banks headquartered in the greater Tokyo and Nagoya areas earned higher 
returns; in the early 1990s, those headquartered in Osaka earned lower returns, and those in 
Tokyo suffered a greater fraction of bad loans.  Crucially, the price of metropolitan real estate 
rose more dramatically than rural real estate in the 1980s, and fell more dramatically in the 
1990s.  Because the metropolitan banks loaned to borrowers who invested in urban real estate, 
they did better than rural banks in the 1980s and worse in the 1990s. 
 
3.  Cross-shareholdings. -- Suppose, as reformers routinely argue, that Japanese 
managers exchange blocks of stock with business partners to evade the pressure of the capital 
market.  If so, then firms with large portions of stock held by lead shareholders should earn 
lower returns their rivals.  
  In fact, firms with large block shareholders do not underperform.  Consistently, the 
percentage of stock held by the top ten shareholders has no significant effect on shareholder 
returns.  Although theorists continue to debate whether block shareholdings improve firm 
performance, we note here that the effect probably varies by industry, by market, by 
personalities.  Demsetz and Lehn suggest that firms will choose the shareholding structure that 
maximizes their expected performance.  If so, then the observed relation between shareholding 
patterns and firm performance will be insignificant.  Such is what we observe.   
 
  4.  Financial shareholders. -- Reformers also argue that financial institutions hurt bank 
performance when they buy bank stock.  Fundamentally, they claim that these institutions do 
not themselves maximize profits.  If they hold bank stock, neither will they pressure those banks 
to maximize.  Following the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis, we suggest instead that the effect will 
vary by firm, and that the firms that tend to survive will be those that approach their firm-
specifically optimal level of financial shareholding.  If so, then the level of financial-institution 
shareholding should have no observable effect on shareholder returns.  Again, such is what we 
observe. 
  
5.  Outside directors. -- Reformers write that Japanese firms could substantially improve 
their performance by adding outsiders to their boards.  Yet if many firms are selecting sub-
optimal numbers of outside directors, then those with more outsider directors should outperform 
those with fewer.  By contrast, we reason that firms that could profit from outside directors will 
already have hired them.  Since firms earn a competitive return or eventually die, those with 
more outsiders on their boards should do no better than those with fewer. 
  Once more, so the data suggest.  Whether in the 1980s or 1990s, banks with more 
outside directors do no better than those with fewer.  If outsiders promoted the “social 
responsibility” that reformists so cherish, one might have thought they would prevent moral Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 15 
hazard.  Not so.  As of 1996, banks with more outside directors had no smaller a fraction of bad 
loans than the others. 
 
  6.  Retired bureaucrats. -- Horiuchi and Shimizu claim that by hiring retired MoF 
bureaucrats (they find no effect with BoJ bureaucrats) Japanese banks bought regulatory 
forebearance.  In effect, through these officials they could negotiate their way out of unpleasant 
regulatory predicaments.  Accordingly, firms with retired bureaucrats were more likely to raise 
the risk level of their portfolios, and exploit the government’s deposit insurance and rescue 
commitment. 
  Horiuchi and Shimizu do not suggest that banks without retired bureaucrats could have 
improved their performance by hiring them, and rightly so.  Like other facets of corporate 
governance, this too is endogenous.  Firms should hire retired bureaucrats when retired 
bureaucrats improve expected performance, and do without them when they would not.  In 
equilibrium, those with retired bureaucrats will then earn shareholders returns no higher than 
those without.  Our results again confirm this logic:  like Horiuchi and Shimizu, we find that 
banks with retired bureaucrats earn no more than those without. 
  Yet where Horiuchi and Shimizu argue that banks with retired MoF officials had a 
larger fraction of bad loans in their 1996 portfolios, we find no such results.  Instead, we find 
that the presence of retired bureaucrats at a bank had no significant effect on its loan portfolio.  
If ex-bureaucrats facilitated moral hazard, it does not appear in our data. 
 
IV.  The Significance of Deregulation 
A.  Introduction: 
This debate poses implications not just for corporate law reform, but for regulation and 
de-regulation more generally.  For if some scholars see the source of the current financial 
malaise in corporate governance, some also see its genesis in the 1980s deregulation of financial 
services.  According to these scholars, it was through that deregulation that Japanese firms came 
to raise funds through avenues outside banks.
52  As they did, either managers escaped the 
disciplining effect of “main bank monitoring” and then failed (a theory we summarize in 
Subsection B, below), or banks turned to riskier borrowers who then failed (Subsection C, 
below).  By either hypothesis, the political implications are obvious:  increased competition 
need not create a healthy economy; deregulate without the appropriate governance-related 
infrastructure and disaster can strike even the healthiest economy.   
 
B.  Aoki:  
  Game theorist Masahiko Aoki ties the current malaise to a deregulation-induced decline 
in “main-bank monitoring.”
53  As Japan loosened bond-market restrictions, he argues, firms 
became “less reliant on bank loans and [were] freed from the bank’s implicit and explicit 
intervention.”
54  Increasingly, they raised their funds directly on the capital market and 
diversified their remaining bank debt among multiple banks.  In the process, they “diminished 
the flow of information from firms to main banks, and consequently diminished the bank’s 
ability to perform interim monitoring.”  Ultimately, “a vacuum in the external discipline over 
                     
52 In Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note (Directed Credit), we explain how this exagerrates the unavailability 
of non-bank funds during the period before deregulation.  See also Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note (Nihon keizai 
ron), at chs. 1, 5, 6. 
53 Directly, albeit more tentatively than we present in the abbreviated summary here.   
54 Aoki, supra note, at 91. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 16 
Japanese firms” resulted.  Banks could no longer could keep managers in line, and newly freed 
managers made risky bets that went bad.
55   
Others echo the hypothesis.  Economic historian Hideaki Miyajima, for example, 
claimsin a recent study:
 56 
[D]uring the bubble economy period corporate governance … was characterized by a 
conspicuous decline in main bank monitoring ….  In the absence of a market-based 
system of control such as that found in the United States, Japan was left without an 
effective system for monitoring and disciplining the top managements of large Japanese 
firms.   
Similarly, Gao asserts that the 1980s liberalization, coupled with the lingering effects of the 
1970s recession, led to a changed relation between banks and firms such that “the banks’ 
monitoring of big corporations deteriorated further.  Having lost their leverage over big 
corporations, banks could not monitor them closely even had they wanted to do so.”
57 
  Unfortunately for this hypothesis, the firms that failed in the 1990s were rarely firms 
that had turned to the bond market.  Indeed, if bond-market firms had been the ones to fail 
rather than bank-loan firms, Japan would not have the banking-sector crisis it does.  The firms 
that could sell bonds in the 1980s were the blue-chip firms, and what were blue-chip firms then 
largely remain solvent today.  The firms that defaulted in the early 1990s were instead those tied 
to real estate:  developers, contractors, and construction firms.  Generally smaller and often 
unlisted, most of them would have been unable to tap the bond market if they had tried.
58 
  
C.  Hoshi-Kashyap:  
Economists Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap similarly argue that the malaise traces its 
roots to deregulation, but not to a failure in main-bank monitoring.  Rather, they reason that the 
deregulation caused a shift in bank-loan strategy.  According to them, deregulation enabled 
blue-chip firms to raise disintermediated funds; these firms increasingly abandoned banks; and 
banks responded by turning to riskier firms that then failed.  “[B]etween 1983 and 1989,” they 
explain, “the Japanese bond market blossomed, permitting many internationally known 
companies to tap the public debt markets for the first time.”  As a result, the banks “lost many 
of their borrowers in a very short period of time.”
59  “[T]he bank mortgage lending business 
became more attractive,” explain Milhaupt and Miller, “when banks began to lose corporate 
finance business to the capital markets in the mid-1970s and 1980s.”
60  To make up the lost 
business, banks turned to real estate developers.  Those developers failed when the market 
crashed, and banks then found themselves saddled with losses.   
To show how blue-chip firms left banks, Hoshi and Kashyap examine the ratio of bank 
debt to assets among the biggest listed manufacturing firms.  That ratio, they note, fell from 36 
                     
55 Aoki, supra note, at 91, 98. 
56 Hideaki Miyajima, The Impact of Deregulation on Corporate Governance and Finance,” in Lonny E. 
Carlile & Mark C. Tilton, eds., Is Japan Really Changing its Ways?  Regulatory Reform and the Japanese 
Economy 33, 57 (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution, 1998). 
57 Gao, supra note, at 38. 
58 Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note (Nihon keizai ron), at 382-84. 
59 Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, The Japanese Banking Crisis:  Where Did It Come from and How Will It 
End?, 1999 NBER Macroeconomics Ann. 129, 143-44 (1999).  Miyajima, supra note, at 53, similarly writes:  
“with the amount of loans to large Japanese firms decreasing drastically from the mid-1970s onward, city banks 
attempted to diversify their clientelle by shifting their focus from manufacturing to service industries (real estate 
and construction), pursuing the business of small and medium-sized firms, and expanding their international 
operations.” 
60 Milhaupt & Miller, supra note, at 29. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 17 
percent in 1970 to 32 percent in 1980.  From 32, it fell to 13 percent by 1990, and there it has 
roughly remained since.
61  “As the banks started to lose their customers to capital markets, they 
went after small firms.”  The result was a “portfolio shift:  increasing loans to the real estate 
industry.”
62 
Ratios mislead here, for the banks did not lose their customers, and bond issues do not 
explain the shift into real estate loans.
63  At root, any decline in loans to these listed 
manufacturing firms was simply too small to have driven any substantial shift in bank loans.  
From 1983 to 1989, bank loans to all listed manufacturing firms fell 6.6 trillion yen (see Table 
2).  During the same period, the total loans made by Japanese banks increased monotonically by 
174 trillion yen.  Even loans to listed firms increased year by year.  At the “city banks” alone, 
total loans increased by 71 trillion.  Banks did not shift into real estate because their loans to 
their traditional clientelle fell, for traditional clients as a whole apparently did not cut their 
loans.  They shifted because they captured huge increases in loanable funds. 
 
                     
61 Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note, at 148 Tab. 5. 
62 Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note, at 163. 
63 Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note (Nihon keizai ron), at ch. 6.  The listed manufacturing firms that cut their 
bank loans in the 1980s-90s were not the firms in the strongest sectors.  From 1983 to 1995, the largest percentage 
declines were in oil (20.3 percent, or 488 billion yen), non-ferrous metals (23.5 percent, or 498 billion), glass (24.3 
percent, or 283 billion yen), and steel (40.6 percent, or 2.6 trillion yen).  Significantly, these were declining sectors 
that are currently losing equity as well.  Consider the Table 1 stock market capitalization test:  the percentage 
change from 1986 to 1998.  By this measure, the oil industry lost 44 percent of its equity value over the period, 
non-ferrous metals lost 23 percent, glass lost 29 percent, and steel lost 10 percent. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 18 
Table 2:  Bank Loans, by Borrower Category 
 
 
          Listed  Firms            .  
                     Manufacturing       . 
       All Firms        Real   Total    Oil &     Elec  Tran 
  Total Const Manuf  Total Const Retail  Est  Manuf Chem Coal Steel  Mach.  Goods  Equi 
1980  1346    73 430  564 33  116 13  267 40 27 55 15 21 36
  
1981  1484    80 468  604 33  120 14  285 42 32 56 16 22 39
  
1982  1640    88 501  641 33  131 16  295 43 29 61 16 22 42
  
1983  1810  100 523  657 34  139 16  293 43 24 64 15 22 43
  
1984  2021  114 553  665 36  150 16  280 42 21 63 15 20 40
  
 
1985  2228  127 582  675 39  154 18  280 43 17 65 16 22 37
  
1986  2444  135 576  690 40  158 20  282 41 17 66 16 25 37
  
1987  2686  140 550  717 41  184 25  268 38 17 60 16 28 34
  
1988  2882  148 539  770 45  242 30  252 35 17 46 16 27 36
  
1989  3551  192 591  813 44  298 35  227 30 18 35 16 26 32
  
 
1990  3760  200 592  857 52  288 45  255 32 27 33 18 34 35
  
1991  3857  216 600  899 71  279 50  275 37 25 33 20 38 39
  
1992  3930  234 592  932 81  275 52  293 40 23 37 21 40 42
  
1993  4776  298 766  937 92  242 54  296 43 21 41 20 36 44
  
1994  4784  307 748  937 93  240 54  290 42 20 42 19 38 39
  







Notes:  Figures are in 100 billion yen.  Figures for “all 
firms” give the loans and discounts through the banking accounts 
of all banks.  They thus exclude loans through trust accounts, 
and loans from such sources as life insurance companies and 
government institutions.  Note that in 1990 when manufacturing 
firms borrowed 59.2 trillion yen through their banking accounts, 
they borrowed only 2.2 trillion yen through trust accounts.  
Figures for “listed firms” include (non-securitized) loans from 
all sources. 
 
Sources:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, ed., Kigyo keiretsu soran 
[Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 
various years); Nihon ginko, ed., Keizai tokei nempo [Economic 
Statistics Annual] (Tokyo:  Nihon Ginko, various years). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 19 
V.  Conclusion 
  Since the start of the 1990s, vast tracks of the capitalist expanse have flirted with 
financial disaster.  Few wealthy economies flirted so dangerously as Japan.  Idolized and feared 
for much of the 1980s, Japanese firms have been ridiculed and shunned for much of the ensuing 
1990s. 
  Did the source of the malaise lie in the governance structures these very firms adopted?  
Contrary to several corporate observers, we suggest not.  Like firms in the U.S., firms in Japan 
face competitive capital, service, product, and labor markets.  Govern themselves inefficiently, 
and they find themselves punished when they ask for capital.  Given that capital market 
constraint, the firms that survive will tend disproportionately to be those with governance 
structures adapted to their markets, their industries, their personnel.  Given that constraint, 
blaming the firms for the malaise is blaming the victim all over again. 
  Consider the reforms academics propose:  unwind cross-shareholdings, hire outside 
directors, disclose more financial data -- and if firms refuse, legislate them offers they cannot 
refuse.  A draconian litany that embodies nothing so much as the the government-can-do-no-
wrong conceit in the academic tradition, it leaves unanswered -- indeed, unasked -- the classic 
Chicago workshop question:  if the reforms are so great, why did firms that ignore them so 
thoroughly earn so much for so long?
64  If cross-shareholdings, inside boards, and non-
disclosure harmed investors, why did Japanese firms that indulged those characteristics succeed 
so spectacularly for decades?  Should they not have found themselves penalized in the capital 
market?  Unable to raise funds competitively, should they not have disappeared?   
  In Japan, the recession hit banks among the hardest.  To ask whether bad governance 
caused the malaise, we explore the relation between governance and performance among 50-
odd banks.  We find:  that banks with outside directors did no better than those without; that 
banks with concentrated shareholding networks did no worse than the others; that banks owned 
disproportionately by financial institutions did no worse than the others; that retired bureaucrats 
did not add value or raise risk levels; and that the financial crisis did not trace its roots to the 
deregulatory steps in the 1980s.  At least according to this banking industry data, bad 
governance did not cause the malaise.  Statutes to change that governance would do nothing to 
end it. 
                     
64 Miwa, supra note, at 1228-29. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 20 
Appendix:  Econometric Estimates 
 
A.  Data: 
  To explore the association between corporate governance and firm performance, we 
assemble a data set containing selected board and financial data for 56 regional banks, from 
1977 to 1996.  We limit ourselves to regional banks to maintain a relatively homogenous 
sample.   
Note that the retired bureaucrats were concentrated in these regional banks.  In 1986, 
only 2 of the city banks had Ministry of Finance officials in positions of representative director 
or higher.  Only 3 had Bank of Japan officials. 
  We obtain our shareholder return data from the Kabushiki toshi shueki ritsu, our bad 
loan data from Kin’yu bijinesu, and all other data from the the Kigyo keiretsu soran.
65 
 
B.  Variables: 
  1.  Dependent variables. --  
  Return on Investment (ROI):  Total annual shareholder returns on investment (annual 
rate of appreciation in stock price plus dividends received) for 1980-85, 1985-90, and 1990-95.   
 Loan  Growth:  Growth in loans (in percent, calculated from book value) at the bank, for 
1977-81, 1981-86, and 1986-89. 
 Bad  Loans:  The percent of a bank’s total loans catalogued as bad loans by the staff of 
Kin’yu bijinesu in 1996.  Following Horiuchi and Shimizu, we also run our regressions using 
the log of bad loans.  The results (available upon request) remained qualitatively similar. 
 
  2.  Explanatory variables. --  
 Outside  Dir:  The number of outside directors on a firm’s board.  We also used a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm had any such directors, and obtained qualitatively similar results 
(available upon request).  We include variables for 1981 (Regs. 3(a)-3(c), 4(a)-4(f)) and 1989 
(Regs. 3(d)-3(i), 4(g)-4(i), 5(a)-5(e)).   
 MoF  Alum:  1 if the bank included as a representative director (jomu torishimariyaku or 
higher) one or more retirees from the central management (kanbu) of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF); 0 otherwise.  We include variables for 1981 (Regs. 3(a)-3(c), 4(d)-4(f)) and 1986 
(Regs. 3(d)-3(i), 4(g)-4(i), 5(a)-5(e)).  We use the comparable figures for 1977 in Regs. 4(a)-
4(c), but for reasons of data availability use all (not just representative) directors in defining the 
variable.  Following Horiuchi and Shimizu, we use a dummy for this variable.  We reason that 
regulatory clearance (the Horiuchi-Shimizu hypothesis) is something one director could handle 
as well as several.   
 BoJ  Alum:  Analogously defined for the Bank of Japan. 
  Top 10 S/h:  The percentage of a bank’s shares held by the ten shareholders holding the 
most bank stock.  We include variables for 1977 (Regs. 4(a)-4(c)), 1981 (Regs. 3(a)-3(c), 4(d)-
4(f)) and 1986 (Regs. 3(d)-3(i), 4(g)-4(i), 5(a)-5(e)). 
 Fin  S/h:  The percentage of a bank’s shares held by the financial institutions listed 
among the bank’s top 10 shareholders.  We include variables for 1977 (Regs. 4(a)-4(c)), 1981 
(Regs. 3(a)-3(c), 4(d)-4(f)) and 1986 (Regs. 3(d)-3(i), 4(g)-4(i), 5(a)-5(e)). 
                     
65 Toyo keizai shimpo sha, ed., Kigyo keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai 
shimpo sha, various years); Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, ed., Kabushiki toshi shueki ritsu [Rates of Return on 
Common Stocks] (Tokyo:  Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, various years); 96 nen 3 gatsu kessan, ginko sogo 
rankingu [Consolidated Bank Rankings, March 1996], Kin’yu bijinesu, Sept. 1996, at 48. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 21 
 Geographical  dummies:  1 if a bank was headquartered in Tokyo, Osaka, or Nagoya; 0 
otherwise.  Note that these are the locations where the price of real estate most radically 
escalated in the late 1980s. 
  Sm Firm Fin:  The percentage of a bank’s loans to firms classified as small- or medium-
sized by the Ministry of International Trade & Industry in 1989. 
  We include selected summary statistics in Table App-1. 
 
C.  Results: 
  In general, stock market returns on investment will most accurately capture any effect 
governance has on shareholder welfare.  For that reason, we urge readers to focus on our 
regressions using Returns on Investment as the dependent variable (Table App.-3).  Because of 
the collinearity among some of the independent variables (see Tab. App.-2), we report the 
results of several different combinations of these variables. 
  At least hypothetically, however, to the extent that shareholders can observe any bad 
governance structures, stock market returns may not reflect the effect those structures have on 
firm performance.  For example, suppose both that a group of firms maintains a systematically 
inferior set of governance structures, and that the structures are ones which an acquiror could 
not remove.  In such a world, investors will anticipate the negative effect of the structures, and 
discount the price they pay for the stock ex ante.  In equilibrium, they will then earn a 
competitive market return on the stock ex post. 
  Other than with regulatorily imposed governance structures, we do not believe this 
occurs.  As we explain in the body of this article, entrepreneurs can indeed launch takeovers in 
Japan, and if bad governance structures were in place they would have strong incentives to do 
so.  Nevertheless, to deal with the possibility that shareholders might anticipate the effect of 
non-removeable, observably bad governance structures, we add regressions using a bank’s loan 
portfolio as the dependent variable.  We then ask which banks grew most rapidly before the 
1990 real-estate price peak (Tab. App.-4), and which banks found themselves with the largest 
portfolios of bad loans after that peak (Tab. App.-5)?  To the extent strategies that maximize 
profits correlate with those that generate growth (obviously a less-than-perfect correlation), the 
results are consistent with the theory we outline above:  variations in governance among firms 
do not explain variations in performance.   
  Our regressions together yield several significant results, but most are a function of 
geography rather than governance.  More specifically, the results reflect the greater volatility of 
urban (we focus on the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan centers) over rural real estate.  
Because banks disproportionately lent to local borrowers and took local real estate as collateral, 
urban bank performance reflected that volatility.  During the early 1980s, Tokyo and Nagoya 
banks earned noticeably higher shareholder returns than banks generally (Regs. 3(a)-3(c)); in 
the early 1990s, Osaka banks earned lower (Regs. 3(g)-3(i)).  Similarly, Osaka banks grew 
rapidly in the late 1970s (Regs. 4(a)-4(c)), Tokyo banks in the early 1980s (Regs. 4(d)-4(f)), and 
Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya banks in the late 1980s (Regs. 4(g)-4(i)).  By 1996, however, the 
Tokyo banks had amassed a larger fraction of bad loans than banks generally (Regs. 5(a)-5(e)).   
  Smaller firms also showed higher variance performance during this period.   
Accordingly, banks that financed smaller firms grew faster than other banks in the late 1970s 
(Regs. 4(a)-4(c)), but by 1996 those loans had disproportionately gone bad (Regs. 5(c)-5(d)). 
  By contrast, the coefficients on the governance variables are seldom significant, and 
even when significant show no coherent pattern.  Most basically, the data exhibit no sign that 
outside directors improve performance.  Indeed, in our stockmarket returns regressions, the 
signs are not even in the right direction (Tab. App.-3).  The coefficient on the presence of Bank 
of Japan alumni on a bank’s board is similarly insignificant.  The coefficient on the presence of 
Ministry of Finance alumni is correlated only with loan portfolio growth in the late 1970s (and Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 22 
then only at the 10 percent confidence level; Regs. 4(a)-4(c)), and is otherwise insignificant.  
Holdings by top 10 shareholders are associated with high growth rates in the late 1980s (Reg. 
4(h)) but not otherwise.  Holdings by financial shareholders are associated with high growth in 
the early 1980s (Reg. 4(d); 10 percent confidence level), but not otherwise. 
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Table App-1:  Selected Summary Statistics 
 
 
   n  Min  Mean  Max    . 
 
A.  Dependent Variables: 
ROI 
  1980-85  42    6.1   17.8   36.9 
  1985-90  46   13.5   20.3   34.0 
  1990-95  55  -20.2   -7.4    5.3 
Loan Growth 
  1977-81  48  158.1 193.8 257.8 
  1981-86  48  119.2 150.4 180.1 
  1986-89  54  115.5 142.5 175.1 
Bad Loans (1996) 
    56     .74   2.77   7.86 
 
B.  Independent Variables: 
Outside Dir 
  1981  49   0   2.5   5 
  1989  56   0   2.9   7 
MoF Alum 
  1977  56   0    .357   1 
  1981  56   0    .286   1 
  1986  54   0    .357   1 
BoJ Alum 
  1977  56   0    .500   1 
  1981  56   0    .446   1 
  1986  56   0    .393   1 
Top 10 S/h 
  1977  48  11.3 22.7 41.6 
  1981  48  13.3 24.4 43.3 
  1986  54  15.5 25.2 40.7 
Fin S/h 
  1977  48    2.3 15.7 38.3 
  1981  48    4.3 17.4 36.7 
  1986  54    6.1 19.1 34.5 
Tokyo   56   0    .179   1 
Osaka   56   0    .107   1 
Nagoya  56   0    .089   1 
Sm Firm Fin  56  58.1  77.7  90.2 
 
 
 Sources:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, ed., Kigyo keiretsu soran [Firm 
Keiretsu Overview] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, various years); Nihon 
shoken keizai kenkyu jo, ed., Kabushiki toshi shueki ritsu [Rates of Return 
on Common Stocks] (Tokyo:  Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, various years); 96 
nen 3 gatsu kessan, ginko sogo rankingu [Consolidated Bank Rankings, March 
1996], Kin’yu bijinesu, Sept. 1996, at 48. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 24 
 





A.  For 1980-85 ROI Regressions: 
 
    BoJ Alum  MoF Alum  Outsid Dr Top10 S/h Fin S/h 
BoJ Alum  1.00 
MoF Alum   .06   1.00 
Outsid Dr  .23    .36   1.00 
Top10 S/h  .22    .11    .31   1.00 
Fin S/h   .10    .20   -.01    .32   1.00 
 
 
B.  For 1985-90 and 1990-95 ROI Regressions: 
 
    BoJ Alum  MoF Alum  Outsid Dr Top10 S/h Fin S/h 
BoJ Alum  1.00 
MoF Alum  -.09   1.00 
Outsid Dr  .21    .23   1.00 
Top10 S/h  .22    .09    .37   1.00 





 Sources:  See Table App-1. 
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   3(a)   3(b)   3(c)   3(d)   3(e)   3(f)   3(g)  3(h)  3(i) 
 
    1980-85       .    1985-90       .    1990-95     . 
Outsid Dr   -.265   -.369   -.532   -.404   -.333   -.287   -.254   -.182   -.279 
  (0.35) (0.50) (0.77) (0.68) (0.58) (0.52) (0.46) (0.32) (0.56) 
MoF Alum  -1.807   -1.841     -.637   -.738      .154    .137 
  (0.89) (0.91)   (0.40) (0.47)   (0.10) (0.09) 
BoJ Alum  -1.035   -.696     .884    .759      .536    .625 
  (0.56) (0.38)   (0.62) (0.53)   (0.37) (0.44) 
Top10  S/h     -.115      -.025      -.099 
   (0.76)    (0.18)    (0.73) 
Fin  S/h      .091      -.060      -.027 
  (0.63)    (0.49)    (0.23) 
Tokyo   7.788**  9.773**  8.216**  .665    .253    .084  -1.064   -.807  -1.181 
  (2.65) (3.58) (3.64) (0.30) (0.13) (0.05) (0.47) (0.37) (0.61) 
Osaka  -4.911  -3.164  -4.403   4.755   4.696   3.993   -6.459** -6.300** -
6.300** 
  (1.27) (0.81) (1.26) (1.57) (1.49) (1.53) (2.72) (2.66) (2.94) 
Nagoya   5.068*   5.043*   5.216*  -2.589  -2.489  -2.390   -.448   -.423   -.425 
  (1.80) (1.80) (1.96) (1.17) (1.12) (1.12) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
S Firm Fin   -.127    -.120   -.107    .158    .149    .158   -.136   -.134   -.156 
  (0.35) (0.92) (0.87) (1.44) (1.38) (1.63) (1.22) (1.22) (1.60) 
 
 
Adj R2   0.27   0.27   0.31   0.02   0.01   0.08   0.10   0.11   0.16 
 
n  41 41 42 44 44 44 53 53 55 
 
 
 Notes:  The dependent variable is Return on Investment.  
The regressions are ordinary least squares.  The table gives the 
coefficient, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistic 
in parentheses.  * -- statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, two-tailed test; ** -- statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.  All equations include 
a constant term, not reported. 
 
 Sources:  See Table App-1. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 26 
Table App.-4:  Loan Regressions -- 






   (4a)   (4b)   (4c)   (4d)   (4e)   (4f)   4(g)   4(h)   4(i) 
 
          1977-81         .           1981-86        .           1986-89       . 
Outside Dr   1.327    .966   2.828   -.357   -.753   -.628   1.822   1.348   1.720 
  (0.68) (0.49) (1.51) (0.25) (0.51) (0.46) (1.47) (1.09) (1.43) 
MoF Alum   9.933*  10.245*      .787   1.689    -2.645  -1.742   
  (1.94) (1.96)   (0.20) (0.42)   (0.74) (0.51)  
BoJ  Alum    6.460   6.261   -2.580 -2.221   -4.215 -4.332 
  (1.26) (1.20)   (0.72) (0.59)   (1.27) (1.35) 
Top10 S/h     .385        .166        .683** 
   (0.97)    (0.55)    (2.24) 
Fin S/h    .462        .500*        .401   
  (1.26)    (1.79)    (1.47) 
Tokyo  -4.621  -2.614   2.958  17.526** 21.555** 22.767** 15.357** 15.537**
 18.229** 
  (0.61) (0.36) (0.44) (3.06) (3.89) (4.67) (3.12) (3.44) (4.07) 
Osaka  17.554** 16.715** 19.658**  5.471   5.537   5.529  10.205*   9.026   8.992* 
  (2.28) (2.14) (2.50) (0.96) (0.93) (0.97) (1.84) (1.67) (1.69) 
Nagoya  -2.010 -1.988 -5.135   8.924   8.885   9.306 11.678**  11.489**
 11.512** 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.64) (1.52) (1.46) (1.58) (2.13) (2.16) (2.10) 
S Firm Fin    .748**   .742**   .740**   .227    .248    .258    .037    .054    .136 
  (2.13) (2.10) (2.03) (0.86) (0.91) (0.97) (0.14) (0.22) (0.55) 
 
 
Adj R2   0.32   0.32   0.27   0.33   0.28   0.32   0.33   0.37   0.33 
 




 Notes:  The dependent variable is Loan Growth.  The 
regressions are ordinary least squares.  The table gives the 
coefficient, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistic 
in parentheses.  * -- statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, two-tailed test; ** -- statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.  All equations include 
a constant term, not reported. 
 
 Sources:  See Table App-1. 
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Table App-5:  Loan Regressions -- 





         5(a)       5(b)      5(c)    5(d)     5(e) 
                     
. 
Outside Dir   .030 (0.17)   .002 (0.01)    .098 (0.59) 
MoF Alum   .481 (0.97)   .583 (1.20)     .707 (1.49) 
BoJ Alum  -.712 (1.55)  -.687 (1.51)      -.705 
(1.61) 
Top 10 S/h   .047 (1.09) 
Fin S/h   .041 (1.08)   
Tokyo  1.416 (2.08)**  1.525 (2.37)**   1.539 (2.47)**  1.621 (2.89)** 1.790 
(3.16)** 
Osaka   .906 (1.18)   .817 (1.07)    .869 (1.17)   .601 (.80)  1.077 
(1.49) 
Nagoya  -.837 (1.10)  -.853 (1.13)  -1.027 (1.33)  -.999 (1.32)  -.979 
(1.29) 
Sm Firm Fin   .043 (1.21)   .047 (1.32)    .059 (1.77)*   .068 (2.07)**  .048 
(1.51) 
 
Adj R2   0.20   0.20   0.17   0.20   0.21 
 
n   54   54   56   56   56 
 
 
 Notes:  The dependent variable is Bad Loans.  The 
regressions are ordinary least squares.  The table gives the 
coefficient, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistic 
in parentheses.  * -- statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, two-tailed test; ** -- statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.  All equations include 
a constant term, not reported. 
 
 Sources:  See Table App-1. 
 
 
 
 